State v. Hunter Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40950 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-21-2013
State v. Hunter Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40950
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hunter Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40950" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4324.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4324
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Supreme Court No. 40950 
vs. 
MARK C. HUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Based on an event occurring on 16 April 2011, IVIark C. 
Hun::::er (Hunter) was charged wi th a DUI in Boise, Idaho. (R. at 
6.) Defense counsel eventually filed a motion to suppress 
evidence on the basis of a detention that exceeded the scope 
all by the initial stop, (R. at 34-35.) to which the state 
ected. (R. at 36-37.) The court required counsel to brief 
the issue of timeliness. 
Hunter filed a Memorandum in support of his motion. (R. at 
31-44.) The state filed a Response. (R. at 45-57.) 
A short evidentiary hearing was held on 7 November 2011. 
(R. at 58.) The parties stipulated to admit the police report 
with a correction as noted in the stipulation of the parties. 
(R. at 63-73.) On 6 December 2011, the magistrate granted 
Hunter's motion and suppressed the resul t of the breath test. 
(R. at 60 62.) The magistrate's Decision and Order layout the 
specific facts found by the court: 
On April 16 th at three minutes after midnight the 
defendant was stopped at eighth and Myrtle for driving 
without headlights. There was the odor of alcohol and 
the defendant admitted drinking three vodka tonics 
between 7:30 and 10:30. Officer Robert Gibson 
responded and conducted three field sobriety tests. 
The defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test, but passed the one leg stand and the walk and 
turn tests. The defendant was then arrested and 
submitted to a breath test which resulted in readings 
of .090 and .088. 
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the relevant law to these facts, the court 
concluded that the HGN test was rendered unreliable as a matter 
of law, pursuant to State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881 (1991). 
The court further concluded the remaining factors were 
i ficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. 
Therefore, the magistrate ordered the result of the breath test 
suppressed. (R. at 60-62.) 
The State appealed this order to the district court. 
Briefing followed. The District Judge reversed the magistrate's 
cision, finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest 
Hum::er. (R. at 140 149.) 
Hunter timely appeals to this court. (R. at 151-153.) 
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II. ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the District Judge err in reversing the order of 
the magistrate? 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in 
ts appellate capacity, the decision of the district court is 
reviewed directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 
183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). We examine the magistrate record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. 
Substantial evidence is If such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
rnind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. If State 
v. on, 132 Idaho 589, 593, 977 p.2d 203, 207 (1999) 
__ ~L-~,--_ 
(quoting Bullard v. Sun Vall Aviation Inc., 12 8 Idaho 43 0 , 
432, 914 P.2d 564, 566 (1996)) Although we defer to the trial 
cOL1.rt's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence, we exercise free review over questions of law. 
Losser, 145 Idaho at 672,183 P.3d at 760; State v. Madden, 127 
Idaho 894, 896, 908 P.2d 587, 589 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Actual Facts 
Hunter was stopped shortly after midnight on 16 April 2011, 
after an officer observed him leave a parking garage and operate 
a motor vehicle on a city street In downtown Boise with no 
headlights. Upon speaking with Hunter, the officer smelled the 
odor of alcoholic beverage, and Hunter admi tted to consuming 
three drinks in the prior four and one half hours. The officer 
observed HGN In Hunter's eyes, while he was seated in the 
driver's seat. The officer had Hunter step out of the vehicle 
to perform SFSTs. The officer noted that Hunter's eyes were 
assy and bloodshot. Hunter indicated he had no physical 
impairments, head injuries or eye problems. SFSTs ensued. The 
officer scored Hunter six points on the HGN test. The officer 
scored Hunter zero points on the Walk and Turn test. This is 
out of eight possible points, with a failure being two points or 
more. The officer scored Hunter one point on the One Leg Stand 
test, out of four points possible, with a failure also being two 
or more points. The officer then performed a second HGN exam, 
noting the same scoring errors. The officer then placed Hunter 
under arrest. (R. at 66-73.) 
The facts giving rise to the reasonable suspicion required 
to administer the SFSTs are not really in dispute. The facts 
that can be inferred following the SFSTs are at issue. First, 
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the Distric~ Judge noted that Hunter twice failed the HGN test. 
(R. at 47148.) This places too much weight on that failure. 
HGN is an involuntary movement of the eyes, and one failure is 
the same as ten failures. It is not some ng a suspect has 
control over, and the suspect cannot intentional manipulate 
this test. As an analogy, a person is either colorblind, or 
If you fail a color vision test twice, you are not "more 
colorblind." 
Second, the agreed facts allow for the conclusions that 
during the Walk and Turn test, Hunter did not: 
Start too soon 
2. Fail to keep his balance during the instructions 
3. Stop too soon 
4. Miss heel to toe by more than one-half inch 
5. Step off the line 
6. Raise his arms more than six inches 
7. Take the wrong number of steps 
8. Perform an improper turn 
(R., at 71.) While Hunter could have done any or all of these 
things incorrectly, the evidence in this case is that he did all 
of correctly. Moreover, many of these scoring errors occur 
during the walking portion of the test. For example, a suspect 
has eighteen chances to miss heel to toe. So, for some of these 
scoring items, success actual means multiple successes. 
With regard to the One Leg Stand, Hunter received a scoring 
result for swaying during the test. He did not receive scoring 
points for: 
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1. Raise his arms more than six inches 
2. Hoping 
3. Putting his foot down 
(R. at 71. ) Hunter agrees that the facts that give rise to 
probable cause do not have to be undisputed. However, the 
overwhelming set of facts is chat Hunter did amazingly well on 
the SFSTs. By the state's own scoring system, he passed both of 
the physical tests, although he failed the HGN test. 
Additionally, the DUI Supplement report contains an 
"Appearance" section. (R. at 71.) Negatively, Hunter is noted 
as present ins with the odor of alcohol ic beverage, as well as 
having glassy, bloodshot eyes. Positively, he indicated to 
be cooperative. Hunter did not receive negative marks for being 
vulgar, having mood swings, threatening anyone, speaking slowly 
or rapidly, slurring his words or being "thick-tongued." He was 
so not marked as having an impaired memory. Gi ven their 
appearance on the DUI Supplement, it should be inferred that all 
these negative characteristics are commonly encountered with 
intoxicated suspects, but Hunter displayed none of them. 
In summation, the only additional suspicious facts that 
were obtained beyond those possessed by the officer before 
requesting that Hunter perform the SFSTs, is that he failed the 
HGN, and he swayed during the One Leg Stand test, but such 
swaying did not cause him to score sufficient points to 
constitute a failure of the One Stand test. That is it. 
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B. The Law 
Hunter performed the SFSTs appropriately and did not fail 
the tests. Idaho law requires that if an individual passes the 
SFSTs, absent something "unique, /I the reasonable suspicion for 
his continued investigatory detention is dispelled. Pursuant to 
such case law, the suspect is no longer subj ect to detention, 
hence he clearly cannot be subj ect to arrest. The District 
court erred in finding that probable cause to arrest Hunter 
sted, and In reversing the magistrate's order suppressing 
dence. 
In State v. Jones, 115 Idaho 1029, 772 P.2d 237 (Ct. App. 
1989), a vehicle was stopped for, at minimum, making an illegal 
left hand turn. The driver's eyes were slightly bloodshot and 
his face was "ruddy. /I The driver admitted to consuming one 
martini. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) 
allowed for investigative stops of vehicles, and field sobriety 
tests were a reasonable attempt by an officer to "to obtain 
information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. /I 
(quoting Berkemer v. Mc ,468 U.S. 420 (1984).) 
In State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 
1999), an individual asserted that probable cause was required 
prior to administration of SFSTs. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
rej ected this argument under both the Federal and State 
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Constitut ons. In rej ecting this heightened requirement under 
the ~daho Const it ut ion, the Court noted the "dual purpose" of 
the tests: 
suspicion. 
to confirm or dispel the officer's reasonable 
"Thus, if the individual performs the field sobriety 
tests in such a manner as to dispel the officer's suspicions, 
absent other unique circumstances, the driver will be lefc to go 
on his way." I d., 133 I daho at 481, 988 P. 2 d at 707. This 
ho ding differentiates Idaho law from a state like Colorado 
where, at the time, the "sole purpose of roadside sobriety 
testing is to acquire evidence of criminal conduct on the part 
of the suspect." Ie v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 317 (Colo. 
~984) . The holding of Ferreira is that SFSTs in Idaho have both 
an incriminating and exculpatory nature. The Court went on to 
hold that SFSTs were the least intrusive means reasonably 
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion of drunk 
driving. This holding is reaffirmed in State v. Buell, 145 
Idaho 54, 175 P. 3 d 216 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The District Court relied heavily on State v. Martinez-
Gonzalez, Idaho 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012) In its 
Order. Ie Martinez-Gonzalez is entirely helpful as to what a 
court should look for in determining if probable cause exists, 
Martinez-Gonzalez is actually the most recent statement of 
Idaho's aw regarding the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests: 
" Field sobrie tests are used to either confirm or di 
9 
officer's reasonable icion that a driver lS under t 
influence of alcohol /I Id. , Idaho at 275 P.3d 
at 2 , , I SlS mlne, 
Martinez Gonzalez is a SFST refusal case, and Idaho's law 
is chat a refusal to perform such tests can be considered as a 
+-' negae-lve factor, and may give rise to probable cause. 
The state argued below that the magistrate incorrectly 
applied State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). 
Garrett specifically deals with the admissibility of the HGN 
results. Garret expressly states that "in conjunction with 
other field sobriety tests, a positive HGN test result does 
supply probable cause for arrest .... /I Garrett, 119 Idaho at 881, 
811 P.2d at 491. From that you can conclude that in the absence 
of ocher :ield sobriety tests, a positive HGN test result does 
not supply probable cause. As Garrett expressly states, HGN can 
be caused by factors other than alcohol or drug ingestion. 
c. ication 
Reasonable su.spicion is the legal requirement for an 
officer to request a suspect to per:orm SFSTs. Here, the 
officer's reasonable su.spicion is not challenged. Pursuant to 
Jones, Ferreira, Buell, and the 2012 case of Martinez-Gonzalez, 
the SFSTs are there to confirm or dispel the officer's 
reasonable suspicion. More specifically, in Ferreira, the SFSTs 
were held to have a dual purpose in that they can incriminate or 
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exoner:-a::e a suspect, or at least ter:-minate the investigatory 
detent OD. 
only additional, suspicious factors disclosed by the 
SFSTs are the HGN failure, and swaying during the One Leg Stand 
test. The stipulated evidence shows that Hunter did amazingly 
well on "[he SFSTs, and, in fact, passed them. While swaying 
stands as a suspicious fact, it does not stand on its own it 
is par:-t of the scoring system for the Standardized Field 
Sobr:-iety Tests. If scor:-ing a single point can be held to ripen 
a reasonable suspicion into probable cause, then the scoring 
system of the SFSTs does not matter:-, the science behind the 
standardization of the test does not matter, and no one will 
ever:- pass the field tests. If that is the case, two decades of 
case law - Jones, Ferreira, Buell and Martinez-Gonzalez - stand 
for nothing. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing l this Court should vacate the 
Districc Court/s order reversing the magistrate/s order l and 
this case for proceedings consistent with such ruling. 
Dated this day of August I 2013. 
E 
Attorney for Appellant 
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V. CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on this day of August, 2013, I 
mailed a true correct copy of the foregoing, APPELLANT IS 
BRIEF I to: 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE ROOM 210 
BOISE IDAHO 83720 
depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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